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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 97-1281, 97-1283 and 97-1287 
 
LISA MICHELLE LAMBERT 
 
v. 
 
CHARLOTTE BLACKWELL, MRS., SUPERINTENDENT; 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, 
 
       Appellants 
 
Present: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, 
BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG, 
SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, LEWIS, 
MCKEE and ALARCON,* Circuit Judges. 
 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
(Filed: January 26, 1998) 
 
The petition for rehearing filed by appellee in the above 
entitled case having been submitted to the judges who 
participated in the decision of this court and to all other 
available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active 
service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having 
asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of 
the circuit in regular active service not having voted for 
rehearing by the court in banc, the petition for rehearing is 
denied. Judges Nygaard, Roth, Lewis and McKee would 
have granted rehearing. Attached is Judge Roth's Opinion 
Sur Denial in which Judges Nygaard, Lewis and McKee 
join. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Senior Circuit Judge Alarcon voted only as to panel rehearing. 
 
 
  
       BY THE COURT, 
 
       /s/ Carol Los Mansmann 
 
       Circuit Judge 
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Opinion Sur Denial of the Petition for Rehearing 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, 
 
I voted for rehearing in banc because I am profoundly 
disturbed by the panel's refusal to consider the merits of 
Lisa Michelle Lambert's petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
and by the panel's decision to vacate the judgment of the 
district court and to remand the case with instructions to 
dismiss Lambert's petition. I am familiar with the merits of 
the habeas proceeding from reading large portions of the 
transcript of the proceedings before the district court. As a 
result, I am aware of the evidence of prosecutorial 
misconduct that occurred during Lambert's original trial. I 
find it to be truly shocking. This misconduct included 
suppression of key evidence, witness tampering, provision 
of false testimony, and other flagrant violations of Lambert's 
right to due process. 
 
Once the district court had made factual findings 
regarding the extent of prosecutorial misconduct,findings 
that critically undermined the validity of the original verdict 
against Lambert, I find it to be a miscarriage of justice for 
this Court to turn its back upon the merits of her petition. 
 
Moreover, I differ with the panel's conclusion that a 
failure to exhaust was not excused by the facts of this case. 
I find sufficient the district court's determination that the 
Commonwealth had waived any exhaustion argument. This 
finding of waiver was made on April 16, 1997, after the 
Lancaster County Prosecutor conceded on the record that 
relief was warranted. The district judge, who was present to 
assess the statements and the demeanor of the prosecutor, 
found that the Commonwealth's later attempt to retract the 
concession was ineffective. Nevertheless, the panel's opinion 
concludes that the district court erred in finding waiver 
because of the circumstances in which the concession was 
made. Panel Opinion at ___ [typescript at 32 n.28]. 
Because, however, the panel so carefully avoids any 
consideration of the merits of the case, its opinion fails to 
note that the Commonwealth's concession was made in the 
aftermath of the shocking recollection by the victim's 
mother, Hazel Show, that she had been encouraged by a 
Lancaster County police officer to suppress critical 
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information that corroborated Lambert's account of the 
events surrounding the murder of Laurie Show. 
 
Indeed, even if the district court were to have erred in 
reaching the issue of actual innocence, once there has been 
a demonstration of a miscarriage of justice, such as I find 
here, I cannot turn my back on that showing. 
 
Moreover, even if I were to disregard the Commonwealth's 
concession that relief was warranted, I believe that proof of 
a miscarriage of justice to the extent uncovered in this case 
requires a determination that the issue of exhaustion has 
been waived. In Granberry v. Greer, a unanimous Court 
established that "if a full trial has been held in the district 
court and it is evident that a miscarriage of justice has 
occurred, it may also be appropriate for the court of 
appeals to hold that the inexhaustion defense has been 
waived in order to avoid unnecessary delay in granting 
relief that is plainly warranted." 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987). 
 
I do not agree that the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) has 
eroded the Court's holding in Granberry. I do not agree 
that, once such a demonstration of injustice has been 
placed on the record, we can turn our backs on it under 
the excuse of AEDPA. 
 
Given the degree of misconduct uncovered during the 
fourteen days of testimony before the district court, this is 
unquestionably a case in which the interests of justice 
demand that the exhaustion requirement be waived. 
 
I will make no statement regarding the propriety of the 
extent of the relief ordered by the district court. However, I 
find it impossible to conclude that a habeas petitioner, who 
has proven by clear and convincing evidence that she has 
suffered a miscarriage of justice, must return to a prison 
cell to start her petitions all over again. For the above 
reasons, I believe that the panel should have reviewed on 
the merits the district court's granting of the petition for 
habeas corpus. 
 
Judges Nygaard, Lewis and McKee join in this Opinion. 
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